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9	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
10	WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA	
11	All	ACOMA
12	PERRY ASHELMAN,	CASE NO. C09-5748RBL/JRC
13	Petitioner,	CHSE IVO. Cop 37 IONSEANCE
14	v.	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
15	PATRICK R GLEBE,	Noted for July 30, 2010
16	Respondent.	110000 10100029 00, 2010
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18	The underlying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 has	
19	been referred to United States Magistrate Judge J. Richard Creatura pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §	
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21	636(b) (1) (A) and (B), and Local Magistrate Judge's Rule MJR3 and MJR4. Petitioner is	
22	proceeding as a pauper.	
23	This petition is unexhausted and procedurally barred because petitioner did not file a	
24	motion for discretionary review in the Washington State Supreme Court after the Washington	
25	Court of Appeals denied his personal restraint petition.	
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Petitioner is challenging the loss of 15 days goodtime credits for a serious infraction he received because he sexually harassed a female correctional officer (Dkt. # 5). He alleges that he did not receive due process at his disciplinary hearing because the hearings officer would not give him a continuance to interview the Intelligence and Investigations unit personnel, or view a video tape of the incident (Dkt. # 5). There is no evidence that a video tape of the incident exists according to the Washington Court of Appeals (Dkt. # 15, Exhibit 3, page 4).

# **FACTS**

The Washington Court of Appeals summarized the facts that are germane to this petition as follows:

Mr. Ashelman was charged with the 659 infraction on March 13, 2008, after he waved at a surveillance camera focused on his cell to get the attention of corrections officer Vickie McMahon and then repeatedly exposed and fondled himself. The officer reported Mr. Ashelman's actions as inappropriate and offensive behavior that made her feel uncomfortable. (DOC Response, Exhibit 2, Attachments A, E) In a supplemental report, Officer McMahon stated that Mr. Ashelman did not engage in such behavior when male staff came into the camera booth. (Exhibit 2, Attachment E)

On March 17, 2008, Mr. Ashelman was given a copy of the infraction report and a hearing notice explaining his due process rights and informing him that he could request witness statements in his defense. He requested none. (DOC Response, Exhibit 2, Attachment B) His disciplinary hearing was held on March 19. During the hearing, he requested a continuance for an interview with the Intelligence and Investigation (I&I) Unit and to review the videotape. (Exhibit 2, Attachment B; Exhibit 3, at 3) The hearing officer denied his request and found him guilty based upon the Officer McMahon's infraction report and supplemental observation report. The hearing officer imposed sanctions of 15 days lost good time credit and 3 days in isolation. The hearing officer gave as a reason for the sanctions that Mr. Ashelman committed blatant sexual harassment of a staff member. (Exhibit 2, Attachments B, D)

Mr. Ashelman was given a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reason for the sanctions. (DOC Response, Exhibit 2, Attachment D) The prison superintendant's designee denied his administrative appeal. (Exhibit 2, Attachments F, G)

(Dkt. # 15, Exhibit 3, pages 1 and 2).

### PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner filed a motion in Superior Court contesting the infraction. That motion was transferred to the Washington State Supreme Court as a personal restraint petition. The Supreme Court transferred the case to the Washington State Court of Appeals. The Washington State Court of Appeals ruled on the merits of the petition and found that petitioner received due process and that the evidence supported the infraction. The evidence was the infraction report and observation report of the female officer (Dkt. # 15, Exhibit 3). Petitioner did not file a motion for discretionary review with the Washington State Supreme Court.

### **DISCUSSION**

### A. Exhaustion.

A state prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief in federal court must exhaust available state relief prior to filing his petition in federal court. A federal habeas petitioner must provide the state courts with a fair opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights. <u>Duncan v. Henry</u>, 513 U.S. 364 (1995). In order to bring a ground for relief to this court, petitioner must have exhausted the claim at every level of appeal in the state courts. <u>Ortberg v. Moody</u>, 961 F.2d 135, 138 (9th Cir. 1992). It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts. <u>Id. citing Picard v. Connor</u>, 404 U.S. 270 (1971) and <u>Anderson v. Harless</u>, 459 U.S. 4 (1982). The petitioner must present the claims to the state's highest court, even if such review is discretionary. <u>Larche v. Simons</u>, 53 F.3d 1068, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1995); <u>O'Sullivan v. Boerckle</u>, 526 U.S. 838, 845(1999).

Here, petitioner did not file a motion for discretionary review with the Washington State Supreme Court. Thus, he did not exhaust one full round of state review and his claims are unexhausted.

### B. Procedural Bar.

Respondent argues that petitioner cannot return to state court because he has already filed a collateral challenge and any subsequent petition will be barred pursuant to RCW 10.73.140. When a state prisoner defaults on his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice, or show that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991). Federal habeas review is also barred when the petitioner has not exhausted state remedies but the state's highest court would now find the claim to be procedurally barred. Coleman, at 733; Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1993).

The state court would now find petitioner's claims second or successive claims, and, therefore, barred pursuant to RCW 10.73.140. Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice because nothing the state did prevented him from filing a motion for discretionary review. He has made no showing that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred in this case. The court recommends this petition be dismissed as procedurally barred.

## **CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY**

A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may appeal a district court's dismissal of his federal habeas petition only after obtaining a certificate of appealability (COA) from a district or circuit judge. A certificate of appealability may issue only where a petitioner has made "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (3). A petitioner satisfies this standard "by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further."

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Under this standard, this Court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability with respect to this petition.

# **CONCLUSION**

This petition is procedurally barred. This petition should be DISMMISED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report to file written objections. *See also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Accommodating the time limit imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on July 30, 2010, as noted in the caption.

Dated this 8<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2010.

J. Richard Creatura

United States Magistrate Judge